

**ASSESSMENT OF BATTLEFIELDS FOR
ROUTE 28 ENVIRONMENTAL
DOCUMENTATION IN THE CITY OF
MANASSAS, CITY OF MANASSAS PARK,
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, AND FAIRFAX
COUNTY, VIRGINIA**

by

Mike Klein

Prepared for

Parsons Transportation Group, Inc.

Prepared by

DOVETAIL
CULTURAL RESOURCE GROUP

October 31, 2018

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
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ABSTRACT

On behalf of Parsons Transportation Group, Inc. (Parsons), Dovetail Cultural Resource Group (Dovetail) conducted an assessment of battlefields for the Route 28 environmental documentation in Manassas, Manassas Park, Prince William County, and Fairfax County, Virginia. Three project alternatives (2A, 2B, and 4) identified in the December 2017 Route 28 Corridor Feasibility Study were examined in relation to battlefield resources. The assessment included background review and pedestrian survey to search for surface features in the project area associated with Civil War battles, to identify the effect of the project on the viewshed of the battlefields, and to evaluate the integrity of the landscape and the potential of the project area to contain National Register of Historic Places (NRHP)-eligible Civil War-era archaeological resources.

The project area includes portions of the July 1861 Battle of Blackburn's Ford (029-5117; VA004), the July 1861 First Battle of Manassas (076-5335; VA005), the August 1862 Manassas Station Operations (076-5036; VA026), and the August 1862 Second Battle of Manassas (076-5190; VA0026). The American Battlefield Protection Program's (ABPP) Potential National Register (PotNR) boundary of the Manassas Station Operations and Second Manassas are not located in the project area. In contrast, however, the PotNR boundaries of the 1861 battlefields include segments of all three alternatives near and north of Bull Run. The PotNR boundary of Blackburn's Ford battlefield surrounds the Route 28 bridge over Bull Run. The PotNR boundary of the First Manassas battlefield incorporates a considerable area near Bull Run from well southeast of the Route 28 bridge over Bull Run to the Manassas National Battlefield Park to the northwest of the project area.

The portions of all three alternatives in the undeveloped areas near and north of Bull Run appear to hold the greatest potential for the preservation of intact Civil War resources, as well as those associated with other time periods. Alternative 2B includes a larger portion of the PotNR battlefield boundaries north of Bull Run than Alternatives 2A and 4. In addition, both the Civil War Trust and the Prince William County Historical Commission have expressed concern that road construction in that area will alter the historic viewshed of the battlefields and may impact important Civil War resources. The NRHP-listed Mitchell's Ford Entrenchments, located within the Blackburn's Ford and First Manassas PotNR boundary portion of Alternative 2A directly south of Bull Run, may contain archaeological components. Therefore, although Alternative 4 passes through the PotNR boundaries defined by the ABPP, it includes less of the undeveloped portion of the PotNR area than Alternatives 2A and 2B, and also potentially impacts fewer intact archaeological resources of any type than the other two alternatives.

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INTRODUCTION

On behalf of Parsons Transportation Group, Inc. (Parsons), Dovetail Cultural Resource Group (Dovetail) conducted an assessment of battlefields for the Route 28 environmental documentation in Manassas, Manassas Park, Prince William County, and Fairfax County, Virginia (Figure 1 and Figure 2, pp. 2–3). Three project alternatives (2A, 2B, and 4) identified in the December 2017 Route 28 Corridor Feasibility Study were examined in relation to battlefield resources.

The assessment survey included background review and pedestrian survey to search for surface features in the project area associated with Civil War battles, and to evaluate integrity of the landscape and the potential of the project area to contain National Register of Historic Places (NRHP)-eligible Civil War-era archaeological resources.

The assessment survey was conducted in July 2018 by Mike Klein and Theresa Ulrich. Michael Carmody served as the Principal Investigator. Mr. Carmody and Dr. Klein meet or exceed the standards established for archaeologist by the Secretary of the Interior (SOI).

Dovetail also completed a Phase IA archaeological investigation and a Phase I architectural survey as separate documents as part of the environmental documentation for the Route 28 project, the results of which are detailed in separate reports (Klein 2018; Staton 2018). The archaeological and architectural background review and prehistoric and historic contexts were included in the Phase IA archaeological report entitled *Phase IA Archaeological Survey for Route 28 Environmental Documentation in the City of Manassas, City of Manassas Park, Prince William County, and Fairfax County, Virginia* (Klein 2018). Because that report serves as an accompanying document for the current report, those two sections are not duplicated within this document.





Figure 1: Location of Manassas, Manassas Park, Prince William County, and Fairfax County in relation to the Project Area (Esri 2018a).



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PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The battlefield survey examined the three alternatives under consideration as the location of proposed improvements in the Route 28 corridor (Figure 3–Figure 5, pp. 6–8; Photo 1–Photo 6, pp. 9–11). Beginning south of the intersection of Godwin Drive and Sudley Road/Route 234, Alternatives 2A and 2B extend northeast along Flat Branch to approximately 4,200 feet (1,280.2 m) northeast of Lomond Drive. At that point, the alternatives curve east and extend through residential areas along Alleghany Road and the northern ends of Boundary Avenue, Jacobs Lane, and Round Lane. From there the two alternatives diverge. Alternative 2A continues in Prince William County through Quail Hollow Park, Charmwood Court, undeveloped woodlands, and commercial properties to join Route 28 south of Bull Run. In contrast, Alternative 2B follows Old Centreville/Ordway Road for approximately 1,300 feet (396.2 m) northeast of Bull Run, and curves northeast through undeveloped pasture and woods to join Route 28 approximately 1,100 feet (335.3 m) north of Bull Run in Fairfax County.

Alternative 4 involves improvements to existing Route 28. From just southwest of the intersection of Reb Yank Drive and Route 28/Centreville Road, Alternative 4 follows Route 28 north to a point approximately 1,400 feet (426.7 m) north of Bull Run in Fairfax County.




Figure 3: Location of Alternative 2A (Esri 2017).




Figure 4: Location of Alternative 2B (Esri 2017).




Figure 5: Location of Alternative 4 (Esri 2017).



Photo 1: View Northwest Showing the Woods in Fairfax County North of Bull Run and West of Route 28.



Photo 2: View West Across the Pasture East of Ordway Road.



Photo 3: View West Showing the Woods South of Bull Run, East of Charmwood Court, and West of Route 28.



Photo 4: View East Showing the Woods North of Mitchell's Ford.



Photo 5: View Northwest From the Corner of Route 28 and Orchard Bridge Drive.



Photo 6: View Northeast From the Corner of Route 28 and Reb Yank Drive.

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PROJECT METHODOLOGY

The 2002 Civil War Battlefield Preservation Act directed the Secretary of the Interior, through the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP), to update the 1992 Civil War Sites Advisory Commission (CWSAC) Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields. The update was required to address preservation activities at each battlefield since 1993 as well as changes in environmental conditions of the battlefields and other relevant developments. As part of the update, the ABPP created a four-tiered system that included such factors as historic significance, current condition, and level of threat to determine preservation priorities among the battlefields. Reports, some still drafts, were released between 2008 and 2011. The report for Virginia's 122 battlefields was released in July 2009 (ABPP 2009).

The battlefield Study Areas described in the July 2009 report were used to assess which battlefields were located within the project area¹. Sections of the Study Areas of each identified battlefield located within the project area were visually inspected through a vehicular and pedestrian reconnaissance survey. The four battlefields in the project area were assessed based on the Potential National Register (PotNR) boundaries as defined by the ABPP in their 2009 report (Table 1). The ABPP's PotNR includes the portions of the Blackburn's Ford and First Manassas battlefields within all three alternatives that are near and north of Bull Run. The ABPP considers the portions of the four battlefields in the remainder of the project area too fragmented and disturbed to include in the PotNR of any of the four battlefields.

Table 1: Civil War Battlefields in Portions of the Project Area.

DHR ID	ABPP No.	Property Names	Date	NRHP Evaluation	ABPP Designation of the Portion Within the Project Area
029-5117	VA004	Blackburn's Ford Battlefield	1861	DHR Staff: Potentially Eligible	Study Area, Core, and PotNR
076-5335/ 076-0271	VA005	Manassas Station Operations Battlefield	1862	DHR Staff: Potentially Eligible	Study Area and Core
076-5190/ 076-0271	VA026	Second Battle of Manassas	1862	NRHP Listed	Study Area
076-5036	VA024	First Battle of Manassas	1861	NRHP Listed	Study Area, Core, and PotNR

¹ The Study Area "represents the historic extent of the battle as it unfolded across the landscape." The Core Area "represents the areas of fighting on the battlefield." Unlike the Study and Core Areas, which are based only on historical events, the PotNR "represents the ABPP's assessment of a Study Area's current integrity (the surviving landscape and features that convey the site's historic sense of place)" (CWSAC 2009:14).

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BACKGROUND RESEARCH AND CIVIL WAR CONTEXT

Four Civil War battles took place in the immediate vicinity of the project area: the July 1861 Battle of Blackburn's Ford (029-5117; VA004); the July 1861 First Battle of Manassas (076-5335; VA005), also known as First Bull Run; the August 1862 Manassas Station Operations (076-5036; VA026), also known as Bristoe Station or Kettle Run; and the August 1862 Second Battle of Manassas (076-5190; VA0026), also known as Second Bull Run or Groveton. The Blackburn's Ford Battlefield (029-5117/VA004) included much of the project area near Bull Run. The PotNR of the Blackburn's Ford and First Manassas battlefields in the project area consists of the areas around two fords on Bull Run, Blackburn's Ford and Mitchell's Ford. Blackburn's Ford was near the present-day Route 28 bridge over Bull Run, while Mitchell's Ford was approximately 0.5 mile (0.8 km) to the west. Klein (2018) and Staton (2018) present information about previous Phase I surveys, previously recorded archaeological and architectural resources, and a full prehistoric and historic context.

Battle of Blackburn's Ford (029-5117; VA004)

Recognizing the critical importance of the Potomac River and the rail lines to any Northern attack on Richmond, Confederate soldiers built a series of earthworks overlooking the Potomac River and around Manassas Junction, where the Orange and Alexandria Railroad that served the Piedmont met the Manassas Gap Railroad, a link to the critical Shenandoah Valley. The Valley was not only the 'Breadbasket of Virginia,' but potentially concealed Union forces moving south. Therefore, as the Union military presence in Alexandria and Washington, D.C. grew, Confederate troops poured into Manassas Junction, a small, largely agricultural area, during June and July 1861. Brigadier General P. G. T. Beauregard commanded the forces massed around the railroad junction (Hennessy 1989:1–4; National Park Service [NPS] 2015).

On July 16, 1861, Union Brigadier General Irvin McDowell began to march an unskilled army from Washington against the Confederate forces in and around Manassas Junction. Repeated delays impeded McDowell's progress. Concurrently, the southern commander had massed his forces behind Bull Run. Beauregard had been warned of impending assault by the Confederate network of spies in the Federal capital.

Although a small stream, Bull Run was deeply incised into the surrounding uplands. The steep banks reduced crossings to a limited number of bridges and fords where Beauregard massed his troops. Believing McDowell would focus the impending attack on the center of the Confederate line near Mitchell's Ford, Beauregard ordered his troops to construct a series of defensive earthworks south of the ford.

Brigadier General Milledge Bonham commanded the forces at Mitchell's Ford, while Brigadier General James Longstreet was in charge of the defenses at Blackburn's Ford. Beauregard's plan included a counterattack by Longstreet, whose force was to cross Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford and strike the rear of the attackers while others cut off retreat routes (Hennessey 1989:6–11; McPherson 1988:340; Salmon 2001:15–17).

On Thursday, July 18, 1861, McDowell dispatched 3,000 Union troops led by Brigadier General Daniel Tyler to reconnoiter the area near Centreville and locate the Confederate defenses left flank. Colonel Israel Richardson reached Centreville first, finding that the confederates had abandoned it. Tyler soon arrived at Centreville. Tyler's orders were to "observe well the roads to Bull Run and Warrenton. Do not bring on an engagement, but keep up the impression that we are moving on Manassas" (cited in Hennessey 1989:12; cf; U.S. War Department [Official Records] 1880:329). Nevertheless, after finding Centreville unoccupied by southern forces, Tyler, along with Richardson, infantry, cavalry, and two ten-pounder rifles, headed to Mitchell's Ford and Blackburn's Ford, both in the project area, to reconnoiter. The Centreville Road swung right to cross Bull Run at Mitchell's Ford, while a rutted country road crossed Blackburn's Ford (Hennessey 1989:13; Official Records 1880:310–314).

The larger force clearly defended Mitchell's Ford, and earthworks south of Bull Run overlooked Centreville Road. Moreover, no earthworks were evident at Blackburn's Ford, and the terrain near Mitchell's Ford provided the defenders a more favorable position than at Blackburn's Ford, because:

the approach to the ford "passed over level ground commanded by a substantial ridge on the west [south] side of the stream. The ground in front of Blackburn's Ford, on the other hand, seemed to be more favorable to the Federals, for there the rolling hills on the east [north] bank fairly commanded whatever positions the Confederates might have on the west [south] bank [Hennessey 1989:13].

From Taylor's command post, he and Richardson saw only a Confederate battery and skirmishers at Blackburn's Ford, but believed a greater force must be present. Their surmise was correct: a brigade commanded by Longstreet was concealed in the woods behind Blackburn's Ford. Warned by McDowell's chief engineer not to fully engage the enemy, Tyler decided to make a demonstration to attract a response that revealed the Confederate defenses. He brought Captain Romeyn B. Ayers' 12-pound howitzers to the fore, and ordered Richardson and, later, Colonel William T. Sherman's brigades, to ready for an advance. Tyler's 12-pound howitzers opened the demonstration by firing on the visible positions near Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords. The Confederate artillery, however, responded "feebly" and withdrew (Hennessey 1989:160).

When called forward, Richardson aligned the 12th New York to the left, and the 1st Massachusetts, the 2nd Michigan, and the 3rd Michigan to the right of the guns. Skirmishers positioned themselves in front of the guns (Figure 6–Figure 7, pp. 17–18). Tyler ordered Richardson's brigade forward to "scour" the ford and flush the enemy (Hennessey 1989:16). Longstreet's skirmishers pulled back across the ford, and the brigade readied for the attack.

Colonel George D. Wells' 1st Massachusetts pushed forward through the woods west of the road, coming under fire as they neared the ford. Wells ordered his men forward. As the 1st Massachusetts neared the ford, the brigade advanced into heavy fire from Longstreet's Virginians. Wells' men fell back to the crest of the ridge, and a firefight began. Tyler, however, believed the results inconclusive (Hennessey 1989:16–17).




Figure 6: Detail From *Troop Movement Map, Battle of Blackburn's Ford, July 18, 1861* (NPS 1981a).

Richardson ordered his entire brigade forward, and led the 12th New York regiment in the attack. Ayers again began to fire, and the defenders responded, and “the entire creek bottom erupted in gunfire” (Hennessey 1989:19). The battle continued for approximately 20 minutes, until a captain gave the order to retreat. Longstreet ordered additional companies forward, and the firefight heated up. Although, the infantry fire provided Tyler with the information he desired, the clash continued. After approximately 20 minutes, the 12th New York regiment began to retreat as a brigade under Colonel Jubal Early arrived with the Washington Artillery. Longstreet’s men counterattacked across the ford as the Northerners fell back. At the same time, the Washington Artillery unleashed a barrage on the retreating soldiers. Longstreet called off the counterattack, and an artillery duel ensued. At 4 P.M., the clash ended. The following day, the Confederate soldiers constructed earthworks for protection during subsequent attacks (Hennessey 1989:12–25; Official Records 1880:310–314; 461–470; Salmon 2001:15–17).

Development has obliterated much of the battlefield south of Bull Run. The NRHP-listed Mitchell’s Ford Entrenchments, all that remains of Beauregard’s defensive earthworks, are located on private land near the ford; additional subsurface remains of the battle may exist

near the earthworks and north of Bull Run, as well as in undisturbed areas east and west of Route 28 (Salmon 2001:17). Recognizing this, the ABPP's PotNR boundary of the Battle of Blackburn's Ford includes only portions of the three alternatives near and north of Bull Run (Figure 8, p. 19).



Figure 7: Blackburn's Ford Legend (NPS 1981a).




Figure 8: Blackburn's Ford (029-5117/VA004) Battlefield Map (ABPP 2009).

The First Battle of Manassas (076-5335/VA005)

First Manassas was the first of the major battles of the American Civil War to take place in Virginia. Although McDowell lamented Tyler's "sorry mistake" (Hennessey 1989:26), the engagement provided valuable information that influenced his plans for the upcoming battle. He settled on a plan to attack from the north through a flanking maneuver, leaving Engineer John G. Barnard to identify the precise points to cross Bull Run. Barnard chose Poplar Ford and Sudley Ford, both northwest of the Warrenton Turnpike, roughly present-day Route 29. The fords could be accessed via roads large enough to allow an army to travel along, and wagons and artillery could be wheeled across the stream. In addition, both were reported to be lightly defended. Union forces were to demonstrate near the lower Bull Run crossings while the larger forces navigated a circuitous route to and across Poplar and Sudley Fords (Davis 1995; Hennessey 1989:26–32; NPS 2018b).

The plan also relied on 69-year old Robert Patterson, a veteran of the War of 1812, who commanded the Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley. Patterson's job was to prevent General Joseph E. Johnston from reinforcing Beauregard. Patterson, however, overrated the strength of Johnston's army and retreated, rather than keeping the Confederate army in the Valley. Even so, McDowell thought Patterson would at least shadow Johnston and arrive with reinforcements; he did not. On July 22, 1861, Patterson, relieved of command, retired (Hennessey 1989:32).

On the Confederate side, Beauregard proposed a plan for the First Battle of Manassas, though Johnston, the commanding General of the Confederate army, opposed Beauregard's plan. Beauregard wanted Johnston to take his forces overland through Ashby's Gap and assault the Union right flank. Johnston, though only a single locomotive was available, sent the troops via sequential, eight-hour train rides rather than following the plan. When the first of the brigades, led by General Thomas J. Jackson, arrived, Beauregard was explaining the plan to his commanders. Beauregard refused to believe Jackson's story, and continued to assume that Johnston was on the march. As more troop-laden trains arrived, it became clear that Jackson's information was correct and Confederate reinforcements also arrived from elsewhere (Hennessey 1989:27–33).

Having received information that McDowell's forces were concentrated along the Warrenton Turnpike between Centreville and Bull Run, Beauregard saw the need for offense. At Beauregard's signal, the entire right flank of the army would cross Bull Run. Troops under General Richard S. Ewell were to cross at Union Mills Ford and advance along Union Mills Road toward Centreville Road. From there Ewell would join the attack along Centreville Road, or trek along the railroad east toward Fairfax Station to cut off the Union retreat. Brigadier General D. R. Jones at McLean's Ford and Longstreet at Blackburn's Ford, supported by Jackson, would do the same. Meanwhile, brigades led by Bonham and Colonel Francis S. Bartow, joined by Colonel Phillip St. George Cocke's Brigade, artillery, and cavalry, were to spearhead the attack. Brigadier General Barnard E. Bee's brigade would serve as mobile reserve. Johnston agreed, but insisted that Bee and Jackson should reinforce the undermanned left flank. Beauregard assented, and added Lieutenant General Wade Hampton's Legion, which had just detrained at Manassas Junction (Hennessey 1989:34–35).

Between 2 and 2:30 AM, 10,000 to 13,000 Union soldiers and five batteries fought through underbrush along a cart path during a 6.0-mile (9.7-km) march around the left flank, while other regiments moved into positions northeast of the stone bridge on the Warrenton Turnpike and north of Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords. Troops led by Tyler feinted attacks on the Warrenton turnpike bridge, and, in a replay of the confrontation at Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords, failed to elicit a response. As had happened earlier, Southern inaction forced Tyler to commit infantry to the demonstration (Hennessey 1989:37–41).

To the southeast, another of Tyler's brigades, commanded by Colonel Israel Richardson, settled into position north of Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords (Figure 9, p. 22). Richardson, having learned from the earlier encounter at the fords, deployed his forces carefully. Six artillery guns commanded by Major Henry J. Hunt moved into place along the roads to the fords, supported by the 1st Massachusetts and the 3rd Michigan. Skirmishers protected his flanks. Richardson held two full regiments in reserve. The roar of a 30-pounder firing from Tyler's artillery signaled the opening of the demonstration. Richardson unleashed Major Henry J. Hunt's guns and the skirmishers rifle fire on the Southern positions, though Beauregard remained unimpressed (Hennessey 1989:41–43). Beauregard's orders were unclear and undelivered, and he never signaled the beginning of the planned coordinated attack. Rather, he advised the brigade commanders to "establish close communication with each other before making the attack" (cited in Hennessey 1989:43). After 7 A.M., Jones decided to cross McLean's Ford, and advanced along Union Mills Road to Centreville Road. There he found himself at a loss: he had been ordered to follow Ewell, who remained at Union Mills Ford (Hennessey 42–43).

Back at Stone Bridge, Captain E. P. Alexander, in command of the Confederate signal stations, noticed a brief metallic gleam in the distance while scanning the Van Pelt's Station from the Wilcoxen's Hill Station. Alexander focused his glass on the area near the reflection. Close examination revealed the sun glinting off cannons, musket barrels, and bayonets. Recognizing the flanking maneuver, Alexander first alerted Colonel Nathan G. "Shanks" Evans at Stone Bridge. Then Alexander sent Beauregard a note advising him that troops were crossing Bull Run upstream from Stone Bridge. Evans' pickets confirmed Alexander's message. Leaving four companies at Stone Bridge, Evans quickly moved toward the Union army with the remainder of his force, approximately 900 men and two artillery guns. He initially positioned his force around a farm road, assuming the Federal troops would advance toward the left wing of the defenders at Stone Bridge. When the Union force threatened to advance past his left wing, Evans relocated to a position on Matthews Hill, along Sudley Road northwest of the Warrenton Turnpike and prepared for oncoming battle. Others occupied the high ground atop Dogan's Ridge, southwest of Matthews Hill, Buck Hill and Henry Hill, all to the south. Although forced to retreat repeatedly, the outnumbered Confederates slowed the Union assault long enough for reinforcements to arrive (Hennessey 1989:35–48; McPherson 1988: 340–345).

The day-long engagement required Confederate forces to retreat, ultimately to Henry Hill and Chinn Ridge. Jackson arrived during a lull in the fighting instigated by McDowell's inaction, allowing him time to secure the brigade's position on the southeastern edge of the hill. There, pine thickets concealed his infantry line from the Federal forces on Dogan Ridge and Matthews Hill, while providing a copious field of fire that forced attackers to cross open

ground for an extended period of time. Hampton's Legion also arrived, but as the battle was again igniting. Also critical to the defense were troops led by Bee and Bartow. It was there, after repeated Union attacks and Confederate counterattacks, that Jackson earned the nickname Stonewall (Hennessey 1989:68–108).





Figure 9: Detail From *Image 3 of Troop Movement Map, Battle of First Manassas, July 21, 1861* at Approximately 2–10 AM (NPS 1981b). See Figure 7 (p. 18) for the key to the symbols.

Meanwhile, McDowell ordered Colonel O. O. Howard to Chinn Ridge in an attempt to flank the Southerners. By this point, however, the Northern army was in disarray. Moreover, Howard's ascent of Chinn Ridge coincided with the arrival of additional reinforcements led by Bonham, Early, and Brigadier General E. Kirby Smith. Under attack, the Union troops misconstrued Howard's order for one wing of a regiment to relocate and began to retreat. The retreat exposed other Union forces to attack, and a general retreat began. Initially a slow withdrawal, the Union retreat deteriorated into flight and the battle became a Southern rout. The bulk of the fighting occurred west of the project area; nevertheless, portions of the clash, particularly during the early and late stages of the fighting, impacted the project area (Hennessey 1989:74–121; McPherson 1988: 340–345; NPS 2018a). The ABPP includes the portions of the First Battle of Manassas near and north of Bull Run within the PotNR of the battlefield (Figure 10, p. 23).



Manassas Station Operations (076-5036; VA026)

The following year, the Second Battle of Manassas (August 26–28, 1862) and the engagements at Manassas Station (August 25–27, 1862) and Thoroughfare Gap (August 28, 1862) were the culminating efforts of an offensive campaign waged by Confederate General Robert E. Lee, Major General Stonewall Jackson, and Major General Longstreet against the Army of Virginia, led by Major General John Pope. After securing Richmond earlier in the year, the Confederate leadership chose to confront Pope and push him further into northern territory.

Henry W. Halleck, the General-in-Chief of all Union armies, ordered units from Major General George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac to sail from Newport News to the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad terminus at Aquia Creek. From that point, McClellan was to march west along the Rappahannock River to join forces with Major General Pope's Army of Virginia near Warrenton. The combined Union army would outnumber Lee's Army of Northern Virginia 130,000 to 55,000. On August 24, units from McClellan's command began to trickle into the western Piedmont. The Union army, Lee reasoned, must be split. During an August 24 meeting at his headquarters west of White Sulphur Springs, Lee presented a plan to his corps and cavalry commanders (Hennessy 1993:49–50, 90–92; NPS 2018b; Salmon 2001:128, 139–140).

To split the Union forces, Jackson's men were to march west and north to disrupt Pope's rail supply lines and destroy the supply depot at Manassas Junction. Simultaneously, Longstreet was to occupy Jackson's position for a time, before following Jackson's army north accompanied by Lee. Stuart's cavalry was to protect Jackson's right flank during the march to Manassas Junction. Longstreet would move on the rear of Pope's army, and the two commanders would trap and destroy Pope in a pincer movement (Hennessy 1998:92–95; NPS 2018b; Salmon 2001: 139–140).

At 3 A.M. on August 25th, Jackson's men withdrew from their camps and marched west through a gap in the Blue Ridge Mountains. Shielded from Union eyes by the Blue Ridge, the Confederates tramped north through the Shenandoah Valley to bivouac near Salem, west of Thoroughfare Gap. The following morning, troops rose, marched unimpeded through Thoroughfare Gap, then followed the unused Manassas Gap Railroad to arrive at Gainesville at 4 PM. Stuart's cavalry arrived as Jackson's men paused at Gainesville. Reasoning that his men were exhausted after the long trek and that fortifications guarded the Manassas Junction supply depot, Jackson had the column turn southeast and follow the road to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at Bristoe Station. The cavalry forged ahead, and attacked and dispersed Federal infantry and cavalry at the station. The Confederates hastily attempted to demolish and barricade the tracks as a Union train powered through the obstructions. Enhanced obstructions and torn tracks derailed a second train, and a third soon plowed into the derailed trains. A fourth reversed course and retreated to Warrenton Junction (Hennessy 1993:101–113; Salmon 2001: 139–141).

Jackson learned that only a few hundred newly minted Union troops guarded “stores of great value” at Manassas Junction. Since time was critical to the split forces of the Army of Northern Virginia, two regiments and the cavalry were moved toward Manassas Junction for

a nighttime attack. Screened by Stuart's cavalry, the Southern infantry crept along the rail line and quickly overran the Yankee defenders (Hennessey 1993: 113–115; Salmon 2001: 140–141).

Pope received a cable alerting him of the destruction of the rail line at Bristoe Station around 8 P.M. At 8:20, he ordered a regiment to entrain at Warrenton Junction and head to Manassas Junction. By midnight, Pope ascertained that Lee's army was split or strung out and therefore vulnerable. By 6 A.M. on August 27th, over 60,000 Union soldiers were marching north toward Gainesville and Manassas Junction, while a force led by Brigadier General George W. Taylor was moving along the rail line toward Manassas Junction from the east (Hennessey 1993:116–120).

At dawn on August 27th, Jackson ordered troops under Major General Richard S. Ewell to remain at Bristoe Station and several brigades were dispatched east to alert him of approaching Union troops. The remainder of Jackson's army entered Manassas Junction, feasted, looted, and destroyed infrastructure. Artillery fire from Colonel Gustav Wagner's 2nd New York Heavy Artillery, dispatched the day before from Washington to fortify the defenses at Manassas Junction, alerted the Confederates of his approach. Wagner assumed only a small band of guerillas occupied the area as he crossed Mitchell's Ford. As Southern troops moved to man the defensive works, Wagner's men advanced. The Confederate artillery opened fire, driving Wagner and his outmanned artillery back (Hennessey 1993:116–124).

Simultaneously, a train carrying some of the troops led by Taylor arrived near Bull Run. The Union infantry disembarked. Assuming that the few forces visible were fellow Yankees, the Union infantry advanced. Despite light shelling that alerted Taylor of the allegiance of the defenders, the battle line continued to advance. As more Confederate guns joined in, Taylor retreated, pursued by Southern brigades. The orderly retreat disintegrated under close fire near a steep hill along Bull Run. As the Union soldiers attempted to flee across the railroad bridge, the Confederate cavalry arrived and killed or captured numerous men, including Taylor who was mortally wounded. Fortunately for the Federals, the 11th and 12th Ohio regiments under Colonel E. Parker Scammon arrived, detrained, and halted the Southern counterattack at the railroad bridge. McClellan, who had recently arrived in Alexandria, refused to send reinforcements. Jackson's men returned to sacking Manassas Junction (Hennessey 1993:124–130; Salmon 2001:139–142).

Meanwhile, reconnaissance by the 72nd New York under Captain Harman J. Bliss drew Ewell's attention. He deployed three brigades to defend the station, a number concealed in woods to the north, and asked Jackson about the appropriate response if the enemy arrived in force. Before Jackson responded, a larger Federal force led by Brigadier General Joseph Hooker attacked. Ewell gradually fell back and burned the bridge over Kettle Run. Southern artillery opened fire as Northern soldiers crossed Kettle Run. As Ewell prepared to retreat across Broad Run, Jackson's directions to fall back fighting arrived (Hennessey 130–137).

Late on August 27th, after collecting all the stores and munitions his force could carry, Jackson burned the warehouses and stores, and departed at 9 P.M. Jackson's regiments marched north along Sudley Road; Ewell was again assigned to guard the rear of the army.

Troops under Colonel A. P. Hill, led by a guide sent by Jackson who misunderstood the directions, crossed Blackburn's Ford and proceeded toward Centerville. As Ewell abandoned Manassas Junction, Union forces were moving into position. Led by a guide given orders to follow Hill, Ewell also crossed Blackburn's Ford. There he was met by staff officers dispatched to find the two commanders. The officers advised Ewell to take the shortest route to Groveton. He led his troops north through fields to the Warrenton Turnpike east of Stone Bridge, where the column headed west to Groveton. Sometime later the staff officers found Hill, and directed him to advance toward Groveton along the Warrenton Turnpike (Hennessey 1993: 139–144). Salmon (2001:142) observes that the “scene of the actions at Manassas Junction have long since been obliterated by the growth of the city of Manassas.” Recognizing the altered and fragmented landscape of the action at Manassas Junction, the ABPP's PotNR boundary includes none of the project area (Figure 11, p. 27).

The Second Battle of Manassas (076-5190; VA0026)

After abandoning the burning Union supply depot at Manassas Junction, Stonewall Jackson took his army of roughly 24,000 men north of the old battlefield along the Warrenton Turnpike in an attempt to draw Pope's army into a fight (Figure 12, p. 28). He positioned his men to the west of the former Union position on Matthews Hill at the Brawner Farm and behind the unfinished bed of the Manassas Gap Railroad, which paralleled the Warrenton Turnpike. On August 28, 1862, Jackson attacked a brigade of Pope's army as it marched down the turnpike in search of him. The first engagement of the Second Battle of Manassas lasted only a few hours until the Union forces withdrew at dusk. But Pope thought he had found Jackson and moved the bulk of his troops into position to attack the next morning at Groveton (Hennessey 1993; Salmon 2001: 145–147).

Pope ordered a forced march during the night and morning of August 28–29. On the morning of August 28, a small skirmish had ensued at Thoroughfare Gap, where Union Brigadier General James Rickett unsuccessfully tried to prevent Longstreet's advance toward Manassas. Rickett's loss enabled Confederate Lieutenant General James Longstreet to join the Confederate forces and engage near Groveton, in the present-day Manassas National Battlefield Park (Hennessey 1993; NPS 2018b; Salmon 2001:142–145). From Stuart, Jackson learned that Longstreet had emerged from the fighting at Thoroughfare and headed toward Manassas. Pope's incorrect belief that Jackson would retreat toward Longstreet, rather than the latter advancing to support Jackson, led him to an assault before all his forces had arrived (Hennessey 1993; NPS 2018b).

The Union forces attempted a series of uncoordinated attacks on the first day of battle. Despite briefly breaching the Southern line at several points, the Northern assault was unsuccessful at driving Jackson from his defensive position. During the afternoon, Longstreet arrived, and took a position on Jackson's right, “overlapping the exposed Union left” (NPS 2018b). Longstreet refrained from attacking, despite Lee urging him to do so (Hennessey 1993; NPS 2018b). Pope noted that several advanced Confederate brigades pulled back during the night to reestablish the line and surmised that the movement presaged retreat. On the morning of August 30, Pope ordered an attack, which a hail of bullets from the entrenched southerners halted. The attack resumed with a larger force, and nearly broke




Figure 11: Manassas Station Operations (076-5036/VA024) Battlefield Map (ABPP 2009).




Figure 12: Second Manassas (076-5190; VA0026) Battlefield Map (ABPP 2009).

Jackson's line until stopped by enfilading fire from Longstreet's troops, followed by Longstreet's counterattack. Fighting raged along the line until sunset, when Pope's force fell back to a position on Henry Hill. Under the cover of darkness, Pope withdrew his troops toward Washington (Hennessey 1993; McPherson 1988:528–533; NPS 2018b; Salmon 2001:149–150). The entire clash occurred west of the project area. The ABPP locates the project area within the Study Area, but not the Core of the battle or PotNR of Second Manassas.

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RESULTS

Portions of each of the four battlefield ABPP-defined Study Areas located within the project area lack integrity, have severely compromised landscapes, and, consequently, were not included in the PotNR boundaries outlined by the ABPP (2009). Most compromised is the Manassas Station Operations Battlefield, the majority of which has been erased by the development of Manassas and Manassas Park.

Only travel routes associated with the Second Battle of Manassas occur in the project area. Both the Battlefield Core and the PotNR are located northwest of the project area, in and around the Manassas National Battlefield Park. Therefore, the discussion focuses on the two battlefields with ABPP-defined PotNR areas within the current project area: the Battles of Blackburn's Ford and First Manassas.

The PotNR boundary of a battlefield, as defined by the ABPP, is that portion of the Study Area that retains sufficient integrity and cohesion to convey the significance of the engagement. It does not constitute a formal determination of eligibility by the Keeper of the National Register. This boundary takes into account the guidelines established in the NPS National Register Bulletin, *How to Apply National Register Criteria* (Andrus 1997).

KOCOA Analysis

Archaeologists have adopted the KOCOA approach to evaluating the military significance of battlefield terrain. The acronym stands for Key Terrain, Obstacles, Cover and Concealment, Observation and Fields of Fire, and Avenues of Approach and Retreat. Terrain typically refers to high ground that provides the occupying force an advantage in any battle (ABPP 2016). During the Battle of Blackburn's Ford, fortified positions on the high ground south of Mitchell's Ford were occupied by Confederate Forces. In contrast, the high ground north of Blackburn's Ford gave the Union artillery an initial advantage. The assault, however, required Union troops cede the key terrain to advance on the Confederation position (Figure 13, p. 32).

Obstacles indicate environmental features that "prevented, restricted, channeled, or otherwise impeded troop movements." Examples include dense vegetation, swamps, rivers, fences, ditches, and hedges. Ideally, the flanks of the forces were anchored by features that impeded the enemy, but maximized ease of movement for the defending force (NPS 2016). The major obstacle facing the soldiers during the attacks and counter-attacks was Bull Run and dense woods near Blackburn's Ford, followed by the steep slopes up to large sections of the high ground atop ridges on both sides of the stream (Hennessey 1989:13–15).

Cover is protection from enemy fire, while Concealment hides all or part of a force from the enemy. Earthworks, ravines, stone walls, and other natural and man-made features provided cover. Woods, ravines, and hills, as well as large-scale cultural features potentially conceal the size and composition of troops from the enemy. Although the majority of Manassas Junction appears to have been open, wooded areas along Bull Run and in the uplands

potentially provided limited cover, as did ravines. Confederate troops concealed in woods near Blackburn's Ford initially led Tyler to underestimate the number of defenders. More important were the entrenchments and earthworks that protected Confederate troops.




Figure 13: Detail From the USGS Mt. Vernon Topographic Map Showing the Project Vicinity (USGS 1888). The red circle identifies the location of the Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords portion of the project area. North is to the top of the map.

Observation and Fields of Fire describe the opposite of Cover and Concealment. An ideal position maximizes troops' viewshed and the open ground the enemy must cross. Such a position allows soldiers to monitor the enemy's movements and forces the attackers to expose themselves to unimpeded fire. Hennessey (1989:13) reports that Tyler's force "emerged from the timber into the fields overlooking Bull Run." Period drawings and

photographs imply that much of the area was open in 1861 (Figure 14) and undoubtedly was by 1862 (Figure 15–Figure 16, p. 33).




Figure 14: Circa 1861 Drawing of Manassas Junction, looking towards Bull Run and Centreville, [...] / from a sketch by our special artist, Mr. Forbes (Forbes 1862).



Figure 15: *Genl. McClellan and Staff accompanied by the 5th Cavalry crossing Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford (Waud 1862).*



Figure 16: Photograph of Union Soldiers at a Picket Station Near Blackburn's Ford Before the Battle of Second Manassas (O'Sullivan 1862).

Avenues of Approach and Retreat refer to the available transportation networks. Clear transportation networks provide access to supplies and medical care and ease the approach toward and retreat from the enemy. Most of Beauregard's and McDowell's troops arrived near Manassas via Northern Virginia's network of roads in 1861. Nevertheless, Johnston's command arrived via train, and the railroad junction at Manassas, a critical link in the Confederate supply lines, determined the location of the battle (Shaible 2013:12).

Troop Movements and Positions

The two armies were positioned south and north of Blackburn's Ford and Mitchell's Ford during both 1861 battles. Union forces were positioned along both the center and sides of both roads. Nevertheless, troops advanced across much of the area near the two fords over the course of the battles. Initially, Union commanders hoped to draw a Confederate response through artillery fire alone. During both battles, however, Confederates refused to respond, forcing the Union infantry to advance and, during the Battle of Blackburn's Ford, attempt to attack across Blackburn's Ford. Kemper crossed Mitchell's Ford to open fire on the enemy during the Battle of Blackburn's Ford. On July 18, Southern forces streamed across Bull Run during the Battle of Blackburn's Ford to attack the retreating Northerners near the end of the Union attacks. During First Manassas, Union commanders demonstrated north of Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords, but the core of the battle was west of the current project area.

More specifically, during the Battle of Blackburn's Ford, Bonham's brigade, which comprised the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 8th South Carolina, was entrenched behind earthworks at Mitchell's Ford. Shield's battery, the Alexandria Artillery, and six companies of cavalry supported the infantry (Bearss 1991:1). Two guns of the Alexandria Artillery were unlimbered 600 yards (548.6 m) north of the ford and west of the road on Kemper's Hill, and two guns were behind earthworks south of Bull Run and west of the road. In addition, Bonham held the recently arrived 8th Louisiana and 11th North Carolina in reserve, before placing the latter to the left of the 8th South Carolina (Bearss 1991:1–2).

Longstreet's brigade, with two of the Washington Artillery's six pounders, guarded Blackburn's Ford. Pickets were located north of the ford. The Southern position, on low ground near Bull Run, was concealed, but far from ideal (Bearss 1991:1).

Around noon on August 18, Union forces led by Tyler and Richardson appeared on the high ground north of Bull Run. The attackers unlimbered a howitzer on the crest of a hill and opened fire, initially on the artillery at Mitchell's Ford. A second, lighter gun also appeared. The Confederate artillery responded but, when the Federal guns found the range, abandoned the position on Kemper's Hill for the protection of the earthworks south of Mitchell's Ford. Still the Confederates failed to respond and fully disclose their position. Therefore, Tyler ordered Richardson to advance on Bull Run where, despite reaching a point near the enemy lines, they encountered only sporadic small arms fire (Bearss 1991:2–7).

The artillery moved further forward to the edge of a clearing, receiving more intense fire. At Blackburn's Ford, Longstreet ordered the Washington Artillery to retire to the rear. After a 30-minute bombardment, the Union infantry, Richardson's brigades, advanced on Blackburn's Ford. As the Northerners advanced, Longstreet's pickets retreated south of Bull Run. The Union troops, particularly the 1st Massachusetts and the 12th New York, were repeatedly repulsed by Longstreet's Virginians. After the initial attacks, reinforcements under Early, including a portion of the Washington Artillery, arrived at Blackburn's Ford from a position to the south. The five guns of the Washington Artillery unlimbered and an artillery battle ensued. Soon after the sound of the cannons reached Centreville, Colonel William T. Sherman was directed to advance to support Richardson; Sherman arrived as the battle was ending (Bearss 1991:2–8).

Three days later, on July 21, 1861, the battle was again joined. As before, Confederates under Bonham manned Mitchell's Ford, and Longstreet's forces watched Blackburn's Ford. Tyler was further west, near the Stone Bridge on Warrenton Turnpike (Route 29). Richardson commanded the Union troops north of Blackburn's and Mitchell's Ford. Unlike the previous conflict, Richardson obeyed the order to demonstrate but not attack while a large portion of the Union army moved to bypass the Confederate left flank undiscovered (Bearss 1991:9–12).

Early on July 21st, the Yankee gunners on the high ground north of Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords opened fire. While Bonham had the protection of earthworks, Longstreet's brigade had moved north of Bull Run, where crossfire from the Northern artillery was a threat. The artillery continued shelling both positions into the afternoon. Longstreet called for support, and orders arrived for Early to provide support for the brigades at Blackburn's and

McLean's Fords to the southeast. In addition, the 3rd Company of the Washington Artillery was detailed to Blackburn's Ford. Longstreet's men took cover, and waited as ordered approximately 1.5 hours before withdrawing south of Bull Run (Bearss 1991:10–15).

Later that morning, Early received orders to reinforce General Beauregard at Henry Hill, west of the project area in Manassas National Battlefield Park. Bonham and Longstreet continued to guard Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords, respectively (Bearss 23–25). Near mid-day, the Union commander, Richardson, spied a Southern column moving across Bull Run. Fearing a flanking maneuver, he ordered his men to fortify the position with earthworks and abatis (Bearss 1991:36). That afternoon, Beauregard directed Longstreet to again move across Bull Run and "carry the Union position" (Bearss 1991:59). However, some of the troops to be involved in the attack were delayed, and Longstreet's men returned to their position south of Bull Run.

By 4 P.M., the Federal attack at Henry Hill and Chinn Ridge, both in the present-day Manassas National Battlefield Park, had collapsed. Richardson received orders to retreat to Centreville. Along the way, a staff officer ordered him to prepare to defend against an impending Confederate advance. Richardson's troops spread out west of Centreville Heights and prepared for the attack. The enemy appeared on Blackburn's Ford Road, were repulsed with artillery and rifle fire, and Richardson's men retreated east on Centreville Road. After sundown, the Union forces entered Centreville (Bearss 1991:93–94; Hennessey 1989: 109–121).

Cultural Landscape Analysis

The battles in the project area occurred north and south of Bull Run, in the vicinity of Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords. Development has altered portions of the areas south of Bull Run to a greater extent than the area north of the stream. Although houses line Route 28 north of Bull Run and extend across much of the uplands near Mitchell's Ford, the topography today closely resembles that of 1861. High ground south of Mitchell's Ford provided the Confederates with a substantial advantage. In contrast, at Blackburn's Ford the higher ground was located north of Blackburn's Ford. Then, as now, steep slopes lined much of Bull Run between the two fords. Thus, the more advantageous position, the Key Terrain in KOCOAs terms, rose north of Blackburn's Ford and south of Mitchell's Ford (Hennessey 1989:13).

In contrast, the road networks and vegetation differ from that of 1861. During the battles, Centreville Road curved southwest to cross Bull Run at Mitchell's Ford, as Old Centreville Road does today (Hennessey 1989: 13). Blackburn's Ford was crossed by a smaller country road.

During the antebellum period, Manassas was a moderately prosperous agricultural community. Agricultural fields and pastures occurred on estates of several hundred acres. Slaves, tenant farmers, and farm owners worked the estates (Schaible 2013:28). Therefore, when the armies clashed in 1861, open agricultural fields and pastures likely occurred in the vicinity of Blackburn's Ford to Mitchell's Ford. Hennessey (1989:18, 21) maps of the Battle of Blackburn's Ford illustrate extensive open areas between Blackburn's and Mitchell's

Fords. Nevertheless, relatively extensive woodlands existed at the beginning of the war. The maps and text indicate that woods covered large areas east of the road to Blackburn's Ford and west to Centreville Road and Mitchell's Ford. West of Blackburn's Ford, the open ground was "punctuated only by tangles of cedar" (Hennessey 1989:15). In addition, wooded areas occurred further north along both roads (Hennessey 1989:12–25). Although fences may have existed in the open fields between Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords, Hennessey (1989) makes no mention of fencing. Today, forest covers much of the formerly open area between Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords.

Prominent military features included earthworks, particularly south of Mitchell's Ford. In preparation for the expected assault on the center of the Confederate line, Beauregard's men constructed extensive earthworks near Mitchell's Ford. Only a small section of the Mitchell's Ford earthworks remain, and extensive development on the uplands has erased most Beauregard's defensive line near Mitchell's Ford. Hennessey (1989) makes no mention of earthworks at Blackburn's Ford. Early's July 31 report on the July 18, 1861 clash at Blackburn's Ford, however, indicates that "the whole of the next day the men were engaged in throwing up embankments to strengthen our position, which was on lower ground than that occupied by the enemy" (Official Records 1880:464).

On the Union side, an August 1, 1861, report by First Lieutenant Fredericks E. Prime of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers refers to the battle on Sunday, but only mentions soldiers engaged in the demonstrations on July 21, which was a Wednesday. Prime indicates that:

Colonel Richardson proceeded to make an abatis to cover a road for infantry and artillery, which should connect with the left. This road was formed on the skirt of wood by cutting down the trees necessary for the abatis. Considerable progress was made in a battery across the road with three embrasures. This had a log revetment for the interior slope, and some ten or twelve feet of dirt in front [Official Records 1880:335].

It appears possible, therefore, that earthworks once existed in the project vicinity south of Blackburn's Ford and north of either Blackburn's or Mitchell's Ford. Nevertheless, no earthworks were observed during the pedestrian survey; the earthworks may not have been in the project area, and agriculture and road or house construction and grading may have destroyed earthworks formerly present on uplands south of Blackburn's Ford and north of the two fords.

Summary and Recommendations

Of the four Civil War battles that took place in the immediate vicinity of the project area, the three alternatives included only the PotNR of the July 18, 1861 Battle of Blackburn's Ford (029-5117; VA004) and the July 21, 1861 First Battle of Manassas (076-5335; VA005). The PotNR boundaries of the Blackburn's Ford and First Manassas battlefields in the project area consist of the areas near and north of Bull Run. The PotNR boundaries of Blackburn's Ford battlefield surround the Route 28 bridge over Bull Run, as well as Mitchell's Ford. The larger First Manassas PotNR boundary incorporates a considerable area north and, to a lesser extent south, of Bull Run from east of Route 28 to the Manassas National Battlefield Park.

The portions of all three alternatives in the undeveloped areas near and north of Bull Run appear to hold the greatest potential for the preservation of intact Civil War resources, as well as those associated with other time periods. Alternative 2B passes through a larger portion of the undeveloped PotNR area north of Bull Run than Alternatives 2A and 4. Moreover, both the Civil War Trust and the Prince William County Historical Commission have expressed concern that road construction in that area will alter the historic viewshed of the Blackburn's Ford battlefield and may impact other important Civil War resources. Nevertheless, the NRHP-listed Mitchell's Ford Entrenchments, located within the PotNR portion of Alternative 2A, may contain archaeological components as well. Therefore, although Alternative 4 passes through the PotNR boundaries defined by the ABPP, it includes less of the undeveloped portion of the PotNR than Alternatives 2A and 2B. For the same reason, Alternative 4 potentially impacts the intact archaeological and above-ground Civil War resources less than Alternatives 2A and 2B.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

On behalf of Parsons, Dovetail conducted an assessment of battlefields for the Route 28 environmental documentation in Manassas, Manassas Park, Prince William County, and Fairfax County, Virginia. Three alternatives, designated Alternatives 2A, 2B, and 4, have been identified. All three alternatives include portions of Manassas, Manassas Park, Prince William County, and Fairfax County, Virginia.

The assessment survey included background review and pedestrian survey to search for surface features in the project area associated with Civil War battles, and to evaluate the potential of the project area to contain intact soils and NRHP-eligible Civil War-era archaeological resources.

The project area includes portions of the July 1861 Battle of Blackburn's Ford (029-5117; VA004), the July 1861 First Battle of Manassas (076-5335; VA005), the August 1862 Manassas Station Operations (076-5036; VA026), and the August 1862 Second Battle of Manassas (076-5190; VA0026). The ABPP's PotNR boundaries for the 1862 battles do not include any portion of the project area. The PotNR boundaries of the 1861 battlefields, however, include segments of Alternatives 2A, 2B, and 4 near and north of Bull Run. The PotNR boundary of Blackburn's Ford battlefield surrounds the Route 28 bridge over Bull Run. The larger PotNR boundary of the First Manassas battlefield incorporates a considerable area north and, to a lesser extent south, of Bull Run from well southeast of the Route 28 bridge over Bull Run to the Manassas National Battlefield Park.

The portions of all three alternatives in the undeveloped areas near and north of Bull Run appear to hold the greatest potential for the preservation of intact Civil War resources, as well as those associated with other time periods. Alternative 2B passes through a larger portion of the undeveloped PotNR battlefield area north of Bull Run than Alternatives 2A and 4. Moreover, both the Civil War Trust and the Prince William County Historical Commission have expressed concern that road construction in that area may impact important Civil War resources. The NRHP-listed Mitchell's Ford Entrenchments, located within the PotNR Blackburn's Ford and First Manassas portion of Alternative 2A directly south of Bull Run, may contain archaeological components as well. Therefore, although Alternative 4 passes through the PotNR boundaries defined by the ABPP, it includes less of the undeveloped portion of the PotNR than Alternatives 2A and 2B. For the same reason, Alternative 4 potentially impacts fewer intact archaeological resources of any type than Alternatives 2A and 2B.

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